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THE MODEL EMPLOYMENT 
TERMINATION ACT 
By Theodore J. St Antoine 
The ModelEmploymentTerminationAct(META), which 
the Uniform Law Commissioners have recommended for 
adoption by all state legislatures, could provide the most 
significant legal change of this quarter century in the Ameri-
can workplace. In addition, if the annual case load of grievance 
arbitrations in this country now stands at somewhere around 
65,000,theActholdsthepotentialforatleastquadruplingthat 
figure. 
Our colleague Jack Stieber has calculated that there are 60 
million U.S. employees who are not protected by union 
contracts or civil service laws, and are thus subject to the 
employment-at-will doctrine. They can be fired for any reason 
whatsoever (absent a civil rights violation), and, in fact, 2 
million of them are discharged each year. Stieber further 
estimates that 150,000-200,000 of these worlcers would have 
a claim under the ·~ust cause" standards generally applicable 
in unionized industries. 
During the past couple of decades the courts in 40-45 
jurisdictions have relied on three main theories to carve out 
certain exceptions to the traditional principle of employment-
at-will. Those three theories include tort (violations of public 
policy, or "abusive" or "retaliatory" discharge); breach of an 
express or implied contract, embodied in a personnel manual 
or an oral assurance at the time of hiring; and breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. For both employers 
and employees, however, there are serious deficiencies in 
these common law doctrines. They constitute a fragile safe-
guard for the worker who has been wronged. Yet, in a given 
case, they can wreak havoc on a hapless employer who runs 
afoul of them. 
The tort or violation of public policy claim will be limited 
by its nature to rare, egregious situations. Few employers are 
going to order their employees to commit perjury or engage in 
an illegal price-fixing scheme, and then fire them if they 
refuse. To avoid a contract obligation, all an employer has to 
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do is refrain from making any commitment about future job 
security. Even existing policy statements against arbitrary 
dismissal can generally be rescinded, as long as there is 
adequate notice to the affected workers. The covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, potentially the most expansive protec-
tion, has been recognized in only a handful of states and is 
being cut back there. Finally, the great majority of successful 
plaintiffs are professionals or upper-level management per-
sonnel. Rank-and-file workers who are fired usually have too 
little money at stake to make their case worthwhile for lawyers 
operating on a contingent fee basis. 
At the same time, the results may be devastating for an 
employer who does get entangled in a wrongful discharge 
court suit. Various California studies show that a plaintiff who 
can get to the jury wins around 7 5 percent of the time, with an 
average award of approximately $450,000. Multimillion 
dollar verdicts for single individuals are not uncommon. Even 
successful defenses may cost between $100,000 and $200,000. 
In addition, a recent RAND study indicates that the "hidden 
costs" incurred by American business in trying to avoid this 
onerous litigation, including the retention of undesirable 
employees, may amount to I 00 times more than the adverse 
judgments and other legal expenses. 
The central defects of the existing common law regime 
are that employees' substantive rights are too limited and 
uncertain, the remedies against employers are too random and 
often excessive, and the decision making process is too 
inefficient for all concerned. META, for which I had the 
opportunity to serve as reporter or draftsperson, attempts to 
address each of these problems. The approach is practical, 
balanced compromise. The Act guarantees the vast majority 
of workers certain irreducible minimum rights against wrong-
ful discharge, but substantially reduces the liability of 
emp toyers. As the preferred method of enforcement, the Act 
substitutes the use of arbitrators in place of long, expensive 
court proceedings. That also means the elimination of way-
ward verdicts by emotionally aroused juries. 
Employees covered by META could not be discharged 
except for "good cause." Good cause could consist of either 
misconduct or poor performance on an individual worker's 
part, or the economic needs and goals of the enterprise as 
determined by the employer in the good faith exercise of 
business judgment. No difference is intended from the appli-
cation of the familiar "just cause" standard appearing in 
collective bargaining agreements. 
MET A would cover most full-time employees (i.e., those 
working 20 or more hours a week) after one year of service with 
an employer. An exception exists for small employers, those 
having less than five employees. Unionized employees are 
covered to the extent permitted by federal preemption law. 
The inclusion of public employees is left to state option. 
A major tradeoff in MET A is the displacement or extin-
guishment of most common law actions based on terminations 
forbidden under the Act. Those would include implied con-
tract claims and tort claims grounded in such theories as 
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defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
the like. There would be no extinguishment of rights or claims 
under express contracts or under statutes or administrative 
regulations, such as those dealing with job discrimination, 
''whistle blowing," or occupational safety and health. 
Remedies would be confmed to those customary under 
the original Civil Rights Act of 1964, namely, reinstate~~nt 
with or without back pay and attorneys' fees for a prevadmg 
party. Severance pay is allowable when reinstatement is 
impracticable, up to a maximum of36 months' pay in the 
most egregious cases. Compensatory and punitive damages 
are expressly excluded. 
An appropriate state agency would ordinarily appoint the 
arbitrator. Awards under this statutory scheme would be 
subject to slightly greater judicial review than awards in 
consensual arbitrations. The grounds would include corrup-
tion, an exceeding of authority, or a prejudicial error oflaw. 
As a matter of principle, the new public right to be free 
from unjust dismissal, like any other public right, ought to be 
enforced at public expense. Yet the prospect of an additional 
and ill-defmed fiscal burden for today's financially troubled 
states could be fatal for a measure that is bound to generate 
controversy in any event MET A therefore suggests, as an 
alternative to the normal filing fee, that the states consider 
imposing a substantial portion of the cost on the parties 
themselves, perhaps with a cap on the employee's share in an 
amount equal to one or two weeks' pre-tennination pay. 
Two hotly debated provisions of MET A allow employers 
and employees to "opt out" of the statute. The parties may 
eliminate the good cause guarantee and substitute a mandatory 
severance payment of at least one month's pay for each year 
of employment. Or they may agree on a private arbitration 
procedure to resolve their dispute. "Freedom of contrac~" 
carried the day here, despite the concern that an employee IS 
seldom in a position to bargain effectively with an employer. 
Courts may be able to minimize the risks of employer over-
reaching by resort to such theories as economic duress, 
contracts of adhesion, and procedural fairness. 
Getting MET A (or its equivalent) adopted in this country 
will be a long, hard process. The plaintiff's bar opposes it 
because it will eliminate large contingent fees. Many non-
union employers oppose it because it will reduce their suzerainty 
in the workplace. The AFL-CIO has endorsed the principle of 
legislation prohibiting wrongful discharge but will probably 
not assign it a high priority. I remain confidentthough that the 
United States will not remain forever the only major industrial 
democracy in the world without generalized legal protection 
against unjust dismissal. The action of the Uniform Law 
Commissioners-a mainstream group of influential lawyers, 
judges, and legislators- is itself indicative of what education 
can accomplish. Initially, the Commissioners considered dis-
charging the MET A drafting committee before we had even 
finished presenting our first report. Two years later, on the 
fmal vote by states, the Commissioners approved META by 
the overwhelming vote of39 to II. 
Editor's Note: This article is reprinted, with permission, 
from The Chronicle, published by The National Academy of 
Arbitrators. Theodore St. Antoine is Professor of Law at the 
University of Michigan Law School. 
